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Hybrid accountabilities and managerial agency in the third sector  
 
ABSTRACT  
This paper investigates how the dynamics of conflicting accountabilities are managed within 
the context of the third sector; specifically in organizations providing services for people with 
learning difficulties.  Multiple accountability relationships create organizational settings that 
are subject to multiple constraints and risks but also offer resources for agency. We analyse 
how managers take up agency to enable them to enact, resist or reconcile multiple 
accountabilities. Our study’s contribution lies in our elucidation of the far-reaching hybridity 
of the third sector and the complex forms of actorhood it cultivates, in which managers are 
able to handle resources with great dexterity, in pursuit of settlements which may only be 
contingent and temporary. 
 




In the UK third sector, ‘intense organizational hybridity’ (Billis 2010, p. 46) is a long 
established, rather than new, situation. ‘Third sector’ is the term increasingly used to 
differentiate those organizations located in the space between market and state, that are 
formally constituted, independent of government (though in many cases receiving 
government funding), non-profit making, and established to further some social purpose 
(Schwabenland 2016). These organizations are located at the nexus of multiple, dynamic, 
‘polycentric’ (Black 2008) accountability relationships: as independently constituted 
organizations, executive staff are legally accountable to the governing board of trustees. 
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These may or may not be comprised of the principal beneficiaries, or users of its services, to 
whom the organization is also accountable. Those staff who are professionally qualified (for 
instance as social workers or nurses) are also accountable for the standards of good practice 
established by professional associations, alongside ever-evolving ideas about how such good 
practice should be enacted. Service providing organizations are further accountable to 
regulatory bodies. Furthermore, as a consequence of the marketization of the public sector 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), services that were originally funded through open-ended grants 
are increasingly likely to be commissioned via tightly specified service contracts that require 
the organization that has ‘won’ a tender to be legally accountable for contract compliance to 
the public commissioning bodies. In totality, these accountability relationships are both 
mandatory (required by law) and self-imposed (not required by legislation and directed 
towards societal rather than state actors) (Koop 2014). In Mulgan’s (2000) terms these 
accountabilities are both ‘core’ (in the sense that accountability is external, it involves social 
interaction and exchange, and implies rights of authority) and ‘expanded’ (ie based on an 
internal sense of personal responsibility for the conscientious performance of duties to fellow 
professionals and to wider publics). The third sector is therefore a promising site for 
investigating the dynamics of accountability relationships because it is at the sharp end of the 
growing complexity of the accountability environment evident across public service 
provision (Benish and Levi-Faur 2012). 
 
Bovens (2007) defines the character of the accountability relationship as that between an 
actor and a forum, whereby the actor ‘has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her 
conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgments, and the actor may face 
consequences’ (p. 450). Third sector organizations must maintain hybrid arrangements 
because their survival is reliant on satisfying the requirements of all the fora to which they 
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are accountable (Brandsen et al 2005; Ebrahim et al 2014). Previous research has highlighted 
challenges inherent in such complex accountability regimes, including managing the tensions 
between demands of government stakeholders and beneficiaries (Ospina et al 2002), between 
business and social purposes (Sanders and McClellan 2012) and the danger of ‘mission drift’ 
(Meyer et al 2014).  
 
Such challenges are not unique to third sector organizations and may be experienced, to 
greater or lesser extent, in any sector where there are tensions between values and market 
driven imperatives. However, we contend that for third sector organizations involved in 
providing services under contract these are existential challenges. For example, a report by 
the Third Sector Research Centre demonstrated that the ratio of funding received from 
commercial activities had increased significantly in relation to other, more flexible sources of 
funding in England and Wales: ‘conclud[ing] that charities are succumbing to market’ 
(McKay et al 2011: 2).  Such concerns prompted the National Coalition for Independent 
Action to launch an enquiry into the independence of service providing organizations, 
arriving at the judgment that ‘overall, the environment for service-providing voluntary 
organisations is increasingly difficult, hostile and getting worse: for the people for whom 
they provide services and undertake activities; for the scope and quality of the services they 
provide; and for their own independence and self-determination in these matters’ (NCIA 
2015:3).  
 
Few studies have investigated how managers deploy agency to devise responses to such 
hybridity, both within the third sector (Skelcher and Smith 2015) and in wider public service 
or professional contexts (Denis et al 2015; Goodrick and Reay 2011). Binder’s (2007) 
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ethnographic study of a third sector housing association shows that managers of different 
organizational subunits enacted divergent responses in their attempts to satisfy multiple 
demands. Binder concludes that, as well as constraining action, accountability relationships 
also carry heterogeneous resources that actors use in interaction to mobilize agency. Writing 
from an institutional logics perspective, Skelcher and Smith (2015) specify a research agenda 
extending Binder’s (2007) work by examining how logics are interpreted and deployed. 
Denis et al (2015) also call for research examining ‘the agency and social interaction 
processes that shape […] responses and consequently explore the hybridization process’ (p. 
285; italics original). This paper furthers understanding of the hybridization process by 
examining the choices managers make in enacting, reconciling or resisting competing 
accountability demands, and how they deploy agency in making these choices. 
 
Conceptualizing agency is itself no easy task; several current streams of research do so in 
ways that variously take account of the plurality of institutional environments, using e.g. 
Critical Realism (Delbridge and Edwards 2013), Actor-Network Theory (Denis et al 2015), 
and institutional logics and actor identities (Skelcher and Smith 2015; Spyridonidis et al 
2015; Meyer et al 2014; Reay et al 2018). Our analysis is based on Emirbayer and Mische's 
(1998) understanding of agency as the deployment of a set of resources deriving from past 
habits, competence at dealing with present exigencies and the ability to imagine various 
possible futures. As Emirbayer and Mische (1998) propose, and as Binder (2007) begins to 
illustrate, actors at the nexus of multiple accountability relationships are likely to be expert at 
dealing with complexity because they have built up extensive repertoires or 'action strategies' 
(Swidler 1986) and are themselves 'complexly structured' (Meyer and Jepperson 2000, p. 
112) or 'modular' (Abdelnour et al 2017). 
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Our study focuses on managers working in third sector organizations that provide services for 
people with learning difficulties1. In this field, for over 40 years, an influential form of 
internal accountability (Mulgan 2000) is to the belief that people with learning difficulties 
should be supported to live an ‘ordinary life’, in the community and alongside people without 
disabilities. Our data are drawn from an action research initiative, established by Transitions2, 
a UK-based training and development provider. The purpose of the action research was to 
help managers identify barriers to the provision of such ‘ordinary’ person-centred services 
and how they might be overcome. Managers raised the theme of competing demands from 
commissioners, families, employees, social workers and from the people they supported, both 
in the workshops that constituted the action research and in subsequent interviews. Their 
managerial positions placed them ‘in situations where they have “no choice but to choose” ’ 
(Kraatz and Block 2008, p. 263) and it these choices we examine.  
 
We begin with a more detailed account of research into hybrid accountability relevant to the 
third sector. We then set out the theoretical framework we use to analyse agency. Next, we 
describe our research design, including the significance of the commitment to an ‘ordinary 
life’ in this empirical setting. We present our analysis of the ways in which managers 
negotiated the multiple accountability demands they encountered in a variety of day-to-day 
situations and conclude by discussing the theoretical implications of our findings. 
 
THE THIRD SECTOR AS A SOURCE OF HYBRIDITY AND MULTIPLE 
ACCOUNTABILITIES  
Billis’s anthology on hybridity and third sector organizations (2010) identifies a paradox. On 
the one hand, the boundaries between the public and private sectors have become so blurred 
that there is little to differentiate them and concomitantly, less space between them in which 
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an alternative third sector can be positioned. Yet, on the other hand, third ‘sector identity 
remains powerful and important…provid[ing] a deep rooted and fundamentally different way 
of responding to problems’ (p. 8). Thus, the perception of distinctiveness is a powerful 
imaginary that continues to have salience despite successive governments’ attempts to instill 
market dynamics and rigours.  
 
The 1993 report published by the Centris Foundation on Voluntary Action (Knight 1993) 
made an early analysis of this fundamental tension, predicting that public sector reforms 
would inexorably lead to a division between organizations providing services, which would 
become contractors of the state, and those concerned with advocacy, campaigning and 
grassroots development. Knight regarded this as inevitable because the service contract 
tendering regimes would increase competition between bidders and de-legitimize their roles 
as advocates for the people using their services. This outcome has been resisted, at least in 
principle, by subsequent generations of people working in the sector (Schwabenland 2016), 
but managers continue to experience conflicts in maintaining both areas of work.  
 
Subsequent research has recognized that the tensions inherent in third sector organizing are 
not only dual, but polycentric (Black 2008). The number and complexity of accountability 
relationships practiced in the wider public sector has grown beyond what is required by law, 
and Koop (2014) suggests that such non-mandatory accountability may become salient if one 
or more of five conditions apply: where the issues the organization is working with are 
politically sensitive; where an organization regards itself as accountable to its beneficiaries as 
well as to its funders; where taxpayers’ money is received; where its legal status may be 
unclear to external stakeholders; and if the organization is ‘young’ and has not had time to 
establish public trust.  
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The potential conflicts facing the hybrid or ‘pluralistic’ organization lead Kraatz and Block 
(2008) to wonder that ‘its mere ability to hang together [is] something of a mystery’ (p. 257). 
Recent empirical studies of third sector organizations have explored how they do indeed hang 
together and satisfy the plural demands placed on them. Ebrahim (2003) notes that 
organizations may either ‘alter their rhetoric to appease multiple principals or dogmatically 
affirm their own missions’ (p.198); however, in a later study Ebrahim et al (2014) suggest 
that non-profits should rather maintain hybridity through finding an alignment between 
potentially conflicting objectives and interests to the overall mission. Ebrahim et al (2014) 
recognize that some stakeholders, whose claims constitute the purpose of the organization, 
typically have little voice, and so governing boards have a particular responsibility to manage 
the tension between ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ accountability. Castellas et al (2018) concur 
with Ebrahim et al (2014) that a ‘critical success factor’ is the ‘ability to sustain pluralism’ 
(p.14), commenting that ‘when one value becomes the super value, the organization ceases to 
be a hybrid’ (p. 14). However, as Sanders and McClellan (2014 p. 68) show, enduring 
tensions remain between ‘being business-like while pursuing a social mission’ and the 
associated conflicts of identity.  
 
Skelcher and Smith’s (2015) review of hybridity in third sector organizations proposes a 
variety of organizational responses to plural institutional logics. Functions oriented to 
different logics may be compartmentalized within the organization or segregated into 
separate organizations - as predicted by Knight (1993). Alternatively, they may be 
assimilated, blended synergistically or rejected, when competing demands are irresolvable. 
Skelcher and Smith (2015) specify a research agenda which examines how hybrid logics are 
handled within organizations and how settlements are reached.   
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Although pre-dating the studies mentioned above, Binder’s (2007) analysis of the responses 
of a housing project to a dramatic shift towards government funding extends understanding of 
the micro-processes by which such pluralism can be managed. Binder’s study proceeds from 
the basis that institutions are ‘inhabited’ (Fine and Hallett 2014) by people who collectively 
make sense of institutional logics and make choices over how to deal with them. She shows 
that managers of different subunits treated logics differently and concludes that logics do not 
only operate on an ‘outside-in’ basis - or ‘upward and downward’ (Ospina et al 2002; 
Ebrahim et al 2014) – but their meaning is negotiated in interaction: hence, managers ‘play 
with them, question them, combine them with logics from other domains, take what they can 
use from them and try to make them fit with their needs’ (p.568).  
 
Binder (2007) contributes by disassembling the organization into its subunits, a move which 
brings into view how responses are conditioned by different accountabilities, such as to 
funders and professional ideals. As she also acknowledges, but does not fully develop, 
individuals themselves are not uni-dimensional, but are carriers of multiple, rival norms, and 
modes of interpretation and action. The conceptualization of agency we use is based on the 
plurality of the individual, as we explain next.  
 
AGENCY IN CONTEXTS OF HYBRID ACCOUNTABILITY  
The seminal article by Emirbayer and Mische (1998) defines agency in both social-relational 
and temporal terms. Agency is: 
 
…a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its 
‘iterational’ or ‘habitual’ aspect) but also oriented towards the future (as a projective 
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capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a ‘practical-
evaluative’ capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the 
contingencies of the moment). (p. 961)  
 
This conceptualization of temporality is situational and plastic: past habits and routines, 
imaginings of future situations and a grasp of the complex practicalities of present concrete 
arrangements are all simultaneously available to actors. Specific social-relational contexts 
have implicit scripts guiding actors along pre-existing pathways, but unfamiliar or 
problematic situations that appear intractable by iterative approaches call for conscious 
deliberation. Although their concern is primarily with modalities of temporal engagement, 
Emirbayer and Mische (1998) close with the proposition that actors in complex relational 
settings may develop greater capacities for projectivity and practical-evaluation. Such 
settings cultivate actors’ capacities for open-mindedness to diverse positions, communication, 
negotiation, and compromise. Delbridge and Edwards’ (2013) Critical Realist evaluation of 
the inhabited institutions approach similarly underscores the importance of personal history 
and biography in shaping the actor’s capacity for reflexivity.  
 
Other scholars have taken the social-relational context as the starting point for analysing 
agency, arguing that agency forms are profoundly socially constructed and historically 
variable (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000; Abdelnour et al 2017). Abdelnour et al (2017) refer to 
institutions as ‘patchworks’ to call attention to the fact that they are made from a hotchpotch 
of different fabrics, stitched together and unstitched dynamically over time. Abdelnour et al 
(2017) argue that individuals become actors only when they take up the social roles and 
positions embedded within this fabric, and consequently, individuals too are patchworks. 
Drawing on the insight of Gellner (1994), they indicate that modern people are 'modular', 
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able to compartmentalize themselves into relatively discrete packages of thought and action, 
accomplished at switching between them, and consequently flexible, multi-skilled and open 
to change.  
 
Meyer and Jepperson (2000) similarly consider the construction of modern actorhood as a 
historical process. As a consequence of the progressive draining of agency formerly 
attributed to nature and religious gods into the individual citizen, modern actors are 
‘complexly structured’ (p.112). With ease, they can become ‘authorized agents’ by shifting 
from agency for the self to acting or advocating on behalf of other actors and indeed abstract 
principles (such as ‘equality’). As Meyer and Jepperson (2000) write: ‘In an instant modern 
actors transform into others: they brim with rule-laden and intendedly thoughtful counsel for 
each other’ (p.113). In parallel, Swidler (1986) defines ‘culture’ as a mixed toolkit of 
symbols, stories and rituals enabling people to construct ‘strategies of action, persistent ways 
of ordering action through time’ (p. 273). As Swidler (1986) emphasizes, people do not 
invent such strategies de novo, but construct them from pre-existing routines.  
 
In summary, Binder (2007) attributes the creative responses she observed to the way 
informants ‘combine and generate practices that are intended to satisfy multiple demands, 
[…] in interaction with others’ (p. 549). We contend that the experience of multiple 
accountability demands, some of which may conflict, others of which may potentially be 
reconciled, creates the conditions in which habitual responses become conscious, may be 
questioned and where the potential for transformative action may reside. These contexts also 
provide an extensive toolkit which ‘modular’ individuals use to negotiate, create alliances, 
resist, accept defeat, try things out, or conduct smooth business-as-usual. We now describe 





Third sector organizations based in England and Wales and providing services for people 
with learning difficulties are the empirical setting for this study. Such organizations are 
located in a nexus of multiple and sometimes conflicting accountabilities that have been 
intensified by public sector reforms. First, an additional accountability relationship has been 
created as central government has established ‘arm’s length’, quasi-independent regulatory 
bodies. Organizations are thus accountable not only to the commissioning body but also to 
the Care Quality Commission (CQC) whose role is to ‘register, monitor, inspect and rate’ 
services and to ‘take action to protect people who are service users’ (www.cqc.org.uk), remits 
which are overlapping, although institutionalized as discrete. These are ‘core’ accountability 
relationships (Mulgan 2000) and mediated primarily through external scrutiny, justification, 
sanctions and control.   
 
In both England and Wales, the processes for designing and tendering contracts have become 
increasingly prescriptive and output-driven, with an emphasis on tasks3. This creates a 
tension, because the field of learning difficulty services is strongly influenced by the idea of 
an ‘ordinary life’ which functions as an ideology in the sense that Swidler (1986) suggests: an 
‘explicit, articulated, highly organized meaning system…aspiring to offer a unified answer to 
problems of social action’ (p. 279-280). Originating primarily in the US, the idea that people 
with learning difficulties should be supported to lead an ‘ordinary life’ accompanied the 
policy shift from long stay institutions to community-based care.4 Towell, who authored the 
eponymous Kings Fund report in 1988, wrote: 
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We want to see people with learning disabilities [sic] ‘in the mainstream of life, living 
in ordinary houses and ordinary streets, with the same range of choices as any citizen, 
and mixing as equals with the other members [....] of their own community. (Towell 
1988, cited by the Centre for Welfare Reform: online) 
 
This commitment shifts the focus of service delivery from the tasks involved in providing 
care to enabling the formation of long term, meaningful relationships, and on helping people 
to become more independent: even if someone will always need some paid support, workers 
are expected to find opportunities for them to exercise as much choice as possible over how 
they live their lives. The ‘ordinary life’ functions in several ways: it provides a heuristic in 
shaping service quality and resolving day-to-day dilemmas; and as a professional norm which 
can form the basis for external scrutiny but also for personal conscience and ‘expanded’ 
(Mulgan 2000) or ‘self-imposed’ (Koop 2014) accountability.   
 
Fieldwork 
Nine organizations participated in the Transitions initiative, seven based in England and two 
in Wales.  All fulfilled the five conditions specified by Koop (2014) for high levels of self-
imposed accountability: supporting people with learning difficulties is always likely to attract 
significant attention when service failures come to light; they are direct service providers; 
they rely ultimately on taxpayer funding; they have a hybrid legal status in the sense that 
although they are not statutory organizations, they are granted authority by them; and they are 
relatively ‘young’ organizations (being between 10-20 years old), and so cannot presume a 
high level of public trust.  Table 1 summarizes these accountability relationships, drawing on 
Mulgan’s (2000) and Koop’s (2014) frameworks.  
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Insert Table One here  
 
The Transitions initiative was designed as an action research project aiming to bring people 
together to identify barriers to the provision of person-centred services, and to develop and 
pilot possible solutions. ‘Action research’ refers to a variety of approaches. Cassell and 
Johnston’s (2006) typology identifies differing underlying ontological positions which in turn 
suggest different roles for the researchers, viz a viz the research subjects, alongside differing 
aims of the research, from more functionalist to emancipatory. Eden and Huxham (1996) 
suggested twelve conditions that action research should fulfil to demonstrate rigour, under the 
themes of 1) generality and theory generation, 2) pragmatic focus 3) research design and 4) 
validity. However, these twelve conditions will be answered differently depending on the 
underlying positions that Cassell and Johnson identify. Within their typology our study is 
located in the inductive/interpretive approach, in which organizational change is the desired 
outcome. Theory was generated from the data produced, both in the workshops amongst 
participants, and through the projects developed and piloted by each organization and 
reflected on in subsequent workshops. Participants were attracted to this initiative because of 
an express desire to identify and challenge barriers to good practice; thus while their 
intentions could be construed as implicitly critical, where such barriers were discovered to be 
systemic and politically imbricated, the primary motivation was to develop and pilot new 
approaches.  The researcher and Transitions staff met regularly between sessions to reflect, 
share ideas about emerging themes and plan the following workshops. Emergent themes were 
shared with participants in the workshops and modified and refined in dialogue. Emirbayer 
and Mische (1998) note that ‘actors who feel blocked in encountering problematic situations 
[the focus of the initiative] can actually be pioneers in exploring and reconstructing contexts 
of action’ (p. 1009). Thus, the initiative presented participants with the opportunity to ‘switch 
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frames’ (Emirbayer and Mische 1998 p.1008) away from unquestioning and iterative 
responses and to develop more projective and pragmatic orientations.  
  
Organizations fielded teams of up to four participants, with between 18 and 25 people in total 
attending each of the five workshops that ran from November 2015 until February 2017. 
Christina negotiated permission to observe the workshops and to interview the lead 
participant in each organization, both at the beginning of the initiative and on its completion. 
At the outset, all lead participants were working as chief executives, project managers or with 
organization-wide portfolio responsibilities such as quality or inclusion. Lead participants 
were chosen for interviewing because there was greater continuity in their attendance, with 
additional team members coming and going throughout the initiative (although, as will be 
shown, even amongst the lead participants there was significant turnover). In Kraatz and 
Block’s (2008) terms, interviewees were those ‘responsible for internally settling issues that 
are unsettled within the broader environment’ (p. 254). The data for the analysis below were 
taken from these interviews. Interview questions were open-ended and focused on 
participants’ reflections on the obstacles to the provision of person-centred support and their 
strategies for dealing with them. 
 
All participants were working under conditions of constant organizational ‘churn’. For 
example, during the period the initiative ran, one organization tendered successfully for new 
contracts, leading to a rapid expansion, and another lost tenders and had to make significant 
cuts. Impacts on participants included redeployment, redundancy and periods of sickness 
absence. It is clear that these managers are working in rapidly changing and high-risk 
situations; risky not only in terms of their own employment but also for the service itself and 
those who rely on it for essential needs. For this reason, although all the lead participants 
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were initially happy to be interviewed, only six of the nine were in post and available to be 
interviewed at the initial stage and four at the end of the project (see Table Two below). Only 
one from the two participating Welsh organizations was included in this analysis, the other 
having been made redundant during the initiative. 
 
Insert table two here 
 
Analysis  
Coding was undertaken by both authors working independently and together as an 
‘insider/outsider pair’ (Lingard et al 2007), enabling us to share emic understanding of, and 
critically reflect on, the data. An early observation was that the majority of participants’ 
accounts encompassed references to multiple accountability relationships and it was not 
possible to code data on the basis of single accountabilities without destroying their meaning. 
Accountabilities were also described in ways that showed that they were not simple exchange 
relationships, but multi-stranded and dynamic. Consequently, first-order codes captured the 
specific accountability relationships present in informants’ accounts, and their orientations 
towards them, using informant-centric terms. Second-order coding analysed how informants 
made sense of these combinations of relationships in researcher-centric terms (Eisenhardt et 
al 2016). We identified a range of possible responses in which single accountabilities were 
simply enacted; and multiple relationships were reconciled (presented as if harmoniously 
aligned); traded off in pursuit of resistance, which could be overt or covert; or actively 
elicited and used together to build coalitions of interest.  
 
Table 3 summarizes how we moved from data to theoretical concepts, with exemplar extracts 
of data and codes developed from them. 
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Insert Table 3 here 
 
 
RESPONDING TO HYBRID ACCOUNTABILITIES  
Below we present our analysis of the ways in which managers negotiated the multiple 
accountability demands they encountered in a variety of day-to-day situations. We highlight 
how they make ‘trade offs’ and settlements between their accountability to the ordinary life 
ideology and the sometimes competing, at other times overlapping requirements of internal 
and external stakeholders. We have identified the following categories of responses:  
mobilizing agency by enacting, reconciling and resisting (often through negotiation and 
coalition building) accountability demands; moving from iterative agency, where routine 
demands can be reconciled, to more complex situations that pushed managers into more 
deliberative modes (predictive and pragmatic).   
 
Enacting 
We understand ‘enacting’ accountability as using agency that Emirbayer and Mische (1998) 
would term ‘iterational’ or ‘habitual’: demands are made but they are seen as legitimate and 
conflict is minimized. We found comparatively few examples of enacting demands, probably 
because such instances are seen as relatively unproblematic, and hence, do not provoke much 
conscious reflection except in conjunction with some greater concern. For example, although 
all participants discussed the impact of diminishing resources, as financial pressures forced 
commissioners to reduce the hours for support specified within the contracts, they did not see 




The service has been pared back but it hasn’t been to the disadvantage of the person. They’ve 
actually been able to grow in their independence … it’s been quite surprising how much 
more this person can do.  
 
Manager 1 sees an integration of demands, everyone shares the commitment to good 
services; indeed, the pressures exerted by the new reforms lead to better services because the 




In many more instances managers actively sought to reconcile demands that might, initially, 
appear to be in conflict. Below, Manager 2 demonstrates that accountability to the principles 
of the ordinary life ideology and its internal logic of supporting relationship-building and 
self-determination can be reconciled with a more task-based approach, but that this requires 
constant attention; such reconciliation may become habitual but only through conscious 
vigilance. She stresses to staff that:  
 
…your job is to have a relationship with the people that you support […]. The things that you 
do when you’re here, like helping someone have a shower or a bath, going swimming, that’s 
how you build the relationship, because you spend time hanging out with people, meeting 
their family and friends. But actually, what we are asking you to do all the time is focus on, 
and build, a good relationship.  
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Manager 3 acknowledged that supporting people to be more independent might require more 
time, but she regarded it as her role to ‘give staff permission', telling them that ‘if it takes you 
50 minutes to do something involving the person, and 30 minutes just doing it, then take 50 
minutes'.  
 
Tasks are, therefore, framed not as ends in themselves, but as means to relationship-building 
and self-determination. Accountabilities to the ordinary life and to the tasks specified in the 
contracts can be reconciled, but only by saying that what you are really doing is something 
else.  
 
However, Manager 4 found herself in more open conflict with a commissioning social 
worker who wanted Manager 4’s staff to be accountable to him for what tasks were being 
done by providing evidence in the form of a log for each service user. In Manager 4’s 
account, ‘[he] told the staff that he wanted them to get a notebook folder for each individual 
and write down on a day to day basis, all the individual things they did’.  
 
Manager 4’s response was firm: ‘I said no, we’re not doing that. The commissioners cannot 
tell us how to record the information. They can tell us what they want, they can’t tell us how 
to do it. And it’s for us to develop the service and to show to them that we are meeting the 
outcomes that they want’. 
 
In this case, the accountabilities overtly conflict.  Manager 4 is accountable to the 
commissioning social worker for ‘outcomes’. She is also accountable to her staff and to her 
own standards of professional and managerial authority – that it is her role to determine how 
time is used and tasks are achieved.  In her response she demonstrates a creative fusing of 
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what Emirbayer and Mische (1998) describe as the pragmatic (how to support her staff in the 
present moment) and future orientated scenarios (what will change). On initial reading her 
response could be categorized as ‘resisting’ but her emphasis on outcomes suggests that she 
is also reconciling the social worker’s demands with her own by invoking a future in which 
the mutually agreed outcomes have been met.  
 
Our next example also presents a tussle for authority, played out over whose interpretation of 
the ‘ordinary life’ counts, and focused on a mundane object, a whiteboard. Manager 5 runs a 
small group home for six young people, some of whom exhibit challenging behaviour, 
including two who do not communicate well verbally when they are feeling anxious. They 
do, however, respond well to written words or pictures; ‘so we had a chat with everyone in 
the house, and they thought [a] whiteboard was a great idea, […] and since the whiteboard’s 
gone up we can write things on it without getting into conversation with that person, it stops 
the whole thing [anxiety] completely’. 
 
However, the commissioners were not happy; to them, the presence of the whiteboard made 
the group home appear like an institution. As Manager 5 indicated, ‘they really didn’t like the 
whiteboard. They wanted it taken down because it wasn’t ordinary life and you shouldn’t 
have things like that up’. But Manager 5 resisted their demands to take it down because ‘it 
works really well, it has a really positive effect, everybody wants it up, it’s their house. So we 
kept it up’.  
 
In this example, Manager 5 and the commissioners are each motivated by the desire to create 
an ‘ordinary life’ for the residents, but there is conflict over how it should be interpreted and 
who decides. Is it best served by ensuring that the living room looks like any other in the 
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street (with no whiteboard), or by respecting the service users’ rights to self-determination 
‘they thought the whiteboard was a great idea’? And how should accountability to the 
service users with anxiety be managed?  Manager 5 suggests that it is the service users’ 
interpretation that should matter, while presenting it as congruent with her own. As in the 
previous example, Manager 5 aims to reconcile competing claims by attempting to 
demonstrate that the conflict is only apparent; underneath it is a shared commitment to the 
principles of ordinary life and service user self-determination.  
 
Resisting through negotiation 
Our next examples differ from the ones presented above, because in these, no easy 
reconciliation seems possible, putting managers in a position where they have to assemble a 
hotchpotch of rationales and resources; but with different outcomes.  
 
Two managers described similar situations in which they were faced with demands from 
commissioning social workers to accept people into their service for whom they judged it 
inappropriate. Manager 3 runs a respite service, and she related her concerns about a re-
referral: 
 
… it just wasn’t the right place for him, and it was leading us to restrain him. Which is 
something we don’t want to do. And the pressure from the local authority to say, well you 
know what? Just do it, because it’s in his best interests and the family need a break. But this 
gentleman is not happy here, this is not the right place for him. […] He needed a much 
smaller, one-to-one service. And I understand that financially it’s not easy, but he was just an 
extremely unhappy young man. So, so difficult. But again, we had the backing from the Chief 
Executive to do that. 
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With her CEO’s support Manager 3 successfully resisted the commissioning social worker’s 
demands.  Manager 5 in contrast had eventually been forced to offer a place to a young man 
even though the other residents did not want to share their home with him. She similarly 
described the pressure as relentless; ‘it went on for a long time, and we kept bouncing it to 
social services, they kept bouncing it back’. This resistance was unsuccessful; the social 
worker’s wishes prevailed, but the outcome was ‘huge conflict’ and ‘increased anxiety for 
everyone’.  
 
Above, the managers are caught between multiple lines of accountability. Managers 3 and 5 
are accountable to commissioners and to service users (those currently living in the house, 
and the people being referred). As managers they are accountable to their own staff, who will 
have to work with the increased stress and anxiety, and, in the first example, having 
previously had to perform restraint. All of these conflicting accountability demands provide 
resources to deploy in the dialectical (Black 2008) negotiations in which the needs of service 
users, the people being referred (also entitled to an ordinary life), families, commissioners 
and the ideals of the ordinary life jostle with each other. But the commissioners are similarly 
enmeshed, knowing there are vacancies in these services. Although managers framed these 
situations as negotiations, that they had ‘won’ or ‘lost’, the possibility of reconciliation 
(presumably by the commissioning social workers finding alternative, more appropriate 
services for the young people being referred) seems not to have been available.     
  
Resistance through building coalitions  
The final example we discuss presents overt conflict between different lines of accountability 
but in this case, located within one individual. In Manager 6’s organization, service users can 
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be elected as trustees of the governing board. One such trustee is Peter, who lives in a service 
which was being re-tendered. Peter expressed anxiety about the possible loss of his service; 
‘he came here for a Board meeting and he said, ‘they can’t make me go to another provider, 
can they?’.  
 
Manager 6 is legally accountable to Peter because he is a member of the Board. In this 
context, Peter is her manager, but he is simultaneously a user of the service, and additionally, 
a person in some distress. Manager 4 has thus to craft a response that balances governance 
accountability, management accountability and advocacy accountability. The option of 
combining her advocacy accountability with her managerial accountability is not easily 
available to her because, within the market logics of the contracting process, passing on 
information about Peter’s distress might be seen as the organization acting with a vested 
interest rather than as an advocate (as highlighted in the 1993 Centris Report). So, while 
outwardly seeming to accept the decision, Manager 6 and her staff put Peter and his fellow 
service users in touch with another advocacy organization which supported them to make 
their own case directly to the commissioning authority. The service users demanded their 
right to personalized budgets, so they could ‘purchase’ the service they wanted. Manager 6 
was then able to reassure Peter: ‘I said no, they’ve told you they’re prepared to give 
personalized budgets and you can choose who you use that personal budget with to provide 
your service. Peter, and his fellow service users, then said ‘good, we’ll use [Manager 6’s 
organization] to provide our services’.   
 
Above we have presented several situations in which conflicting accountability demands 
mean that iterative courses of action are not sufficient. New responses need to be crafted out 
of available resources, including ‘prefabricated’ routines (Swidler 1998) borrowed from other 
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accountabilities. Our managers share Binder’s (2007) creativity and skill but they also deploy 
the resource of the ‘ordinary life’ to evaluate future scenarios and make judgments about how 
to work things out pragmatically in the here and now.  These resources are deployed 
creatively and situationally. For example, Manager 2 resists demands to reduce hours/costs 
by telling her staff to take more time to teach a service user how to do a task rather than 
doing it for them more quickly, but Manager 1 acknowledges that in her case, the pressure to 
reduce demands led to greater autonomy for the services user. Although initially these two 
examples would seem contradictory, they are not. Here, the public sector reform goal of 
efficiency, and the goal of self-determination for people with learning difficulties are not in a 
dialectical conflict but can be reconciled. 
 
DISCUSSION  
Third sector organizations are part of highly diverse, pluralistic, ‘patchworked’ institutional 
arrangements, where newer accountability relationships concomitant with public sector 
reforms have brought increased complexity. Managers are charged with satisfying multiple 
accountability demands and have ‘no choice but to choose’ (Kraatz and Block 2008 p. 263). 
Our analysis has drawn on Emirbayer and Mische’s (1988) conceptualization of agency to 
explore how they make sense of the choices they have made within this context. 
  
First, our study reveals more about how the hybridity within this sector is manifested. We 
have observed the predicted tensions between the organizational roles of advocacy and 
service provision (Knight 1993), demonstrated most starkly in the example of Manager 6’s 
response to Peter. We have also seen that organizational mission (the provision of an 
‘ordinary life’) is deployed, as Ebrahim (2003) suggested, to strengthen the sense of 
distinctiveness (as in Manager 4’s response to the social worker who wanted more 
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documentation). However, our study also demonstrates that hybridity is not only evident in 
the multiple accountabilities which we categorized as ‘mandatory’ and ‘self-imposed’ (Koop 
2014), and ‘core’ and ‘expanded’ (Mulgan 2000); every relationship is itself hybrid. A 
relationship with one person can deliver multiple accountabilities (as we saw with Peter) 
when this individual is simultaneously the incumbent of several roles. Managers’ jobs are 
also comprised of multiple roles; they manage both internal and external relationships and 
provide a buffer when these demands conflict. External agents are also complexly structured; 
families can be resources to be enlisted in coalition-building, and they can also be resisted 
when they are judged to constrain service users’ choices. Social workers and commissioners 
demand contract compliance yet are also juggling demands from families and users, and 
trying to make diminishing resources stretch. Service users may be the primary source of 
accountability but when the needs of different service users conflict (as in the examples of 
referrals deemed ‘inappropriate’) then choices must be made.  
 
Thus, our work extends Binder’s (2007) study, also located in the non-profit sector. Our 
findings support her conclusion that staff are highly resourceful and inventive. However, 
unlike Binder’s, our managers were sufficiently senior that they had to maintain an overview 
of the entire organization as well as the competing demands from external stakeholders; the 
option of ‘segmenting’ responses (Skelcher and Smith 2015) that Binder observed, was not 
available to them. 
 
Secondly, our analysis explores the choices managers make to enact, reconcile or resist such 
hybrid accountability. Whenever possible, managers sought to reconcile demands. This may 
be a consequence of our research design; the emphasis on problematic situations inevitably 
meant that there was less discussion of demands that could be enacted unproblematically 
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using iterative responses (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). However, the examples of what 
appear as straightforward enacting that we observed (in Table 3 as well as at the beginning of 
the findings) suggest that this is better understood as implicit reconciling; the demands of one 
particular relationship presumed to fit in with the unspoken demands of all the other 
accountability relationships that are simultaneously present in the background. 
 
Therefore, it is those situations that provoked disquiet, where demands cannot easily be met, 
that are the focus of our managers’ discussions. In seeking reconciliation managers drew on a 
repertoire of resources, combining pragmatic responses with future imaginings in which 
options were judged and taken up or discarded in terms of the extent to which they were 
likely to promote an ordinary life. Ultimately, decisions were justified in terms of the needs 
of specific service users but these were defined in differing ways (as ‘compromise’ in the 
service for nine residents or ‘reducing anxiety’ in the case of the whiteboard). Thus, while the 
ordinary life provided a foundational heuristic in future imaginings, it was also variously 
invoked to justify excluding a young man whose needs were deemed to be irreconcilable with 
the existing residents, to reduce the number of hours one service user received, or increase 
the time spent with another. 
 
Overt resistance to accountability demands was rare. We found no examples of resistance to 
the CQC’s demands. Resistance to commissioners’ demands were primarily enacted, as 
Emirbayer and Mische (1988) suggest, by being ‘seized on the wing … [which] requires 
shrewdness, tact and situational awareness’ (p.1000-1001). In one case an appearance of 
resistance was described (resisting demands for staff to document their actions) but this was 
done through appealing to shared outcomes. In other examples, when demands could not be 
reconciled (Peter’s desire to stay with Manager 6’s organization) resistance was covert and 
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enacted through building coalitions (increasing the hybridity of actors involved) or by 
manoeuvring and negotiation. Resistance was thus avoided unless there was a perceived 
threat to particular users’ interests (the young man who had been restrained) but these are not 
fixed or absolute. Thus, we can predict that the primary response to conflicting accountability 
demands is likely to be to try to reconcile them through an appeal to self-imposed 
understandings of organizational mission, as expressed through the needs of service users, 
even if this requires compromise and distortion.  
 
Thirdly, we analysed how managers made these choices. As Kraatz and Block (2008) argue, 
plurality is not only external to the organization, but is ‘constitutive and ideational; [...] 
suffusing the organization’ (p. 244). While the managers we studied are themselves plural, 
their superordinate espoused aim is to act as authorized agents (Meyer and Jepperson 2000) 
for their service users. They devise, adapt, and deploy action strategies which can then be laid 
down for future iteration (Swidler 1986): the approach tried out with one local authority 
commissioner can then be re-used with another. The ordinary life is itself a sort of rubric that 
can be enacted and tweaked in situ. Managers are modular, in Gellner’s terms (1994), able to 
separate out the strands tangled up within situations, and openminded to new interpretations – 
such as that by reducing a support package, the service can improve because the 
independence of the service user is increased. Managers demonstrated a propensity towards 
viewing external stakeholders in a variety of ways; families as a source support in one case 
and constraint in others. The complex interactions between these relationships produce new 
demands and simultaneously offer resources to managers. 
 
Our study, of an organisational setting where hybridity is intense, adds to understanding of 
settings where plurality is experienced more moderately. Research into settings where the 
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institutional environment was until recently experienced as singular or intact, have shown 
that the intrusion of new institutional logics allows actors to take up new identities (e.g. 
Meyer et al 2014; McGivern et al 2015).   ‘Nested’ identities are held together with a ‘cross 
cutting’ identity carrying deeply held professional ideals, which is brought to bear across a 
range of situations (Spyridonidis et al 2015 p. 396). Similarly, we find that the ‘ordinary life’ 
is used as a yardstick across practically all problematic situations that managers encounter, 
but it too is multi-faceted, negotiable, and may implicitly be revoked in some circumstances. 
Goodrick and Reay’s (2011) historical study of the pharmacy profession indicates that 
multiple logics that could not be easily reconciled were ‘segmented’ into different 
organisational functions or into separate activities within the job role. In the third sector 
setting we studied, segmentation was not possible, either within the organisation or the 
managerial role. Rather, managers used temporal segregation; a settlement reached in one 
situation may be fleeting and may differ from the next. Like our study, McPherson and 
Sauder (2013) show that professional logics provide a toolkit that is to some extent accessible 
to members of all the different professions involved, who combine them creatively in situ in 
pursuit of diverse aims. What our study adds to these is in our elucidation of the far-reaching 
hybridity of the third sector and the complex forms of actorhood this cultivates, able to 
handle resources with great dexterity, in pursuit of settlements which may only be temporary, 
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Table 1: Accountability relationships in third sector organizations providing services to 
people with learning difficulties 
 








Contract compliance Core Mandatory 
Care Quality 
Commission 
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Professional bodies Adherence to standards 
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Table 2: Participants included in this article  
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Table 3: Analytical strategy 
 











If I can get [strategy] to work with one local 
authority then I can learn from that, and say well, 
they were happy until they got to that bit, so that bit 








We’ve shown [the CQC] what we were doing, we’ve 
explained to them why we were doing it. … we’ve 
got a range of inspectors, but on the whole it’s been 





I have nine people in my service.  We start from an 
individual basis about what is it that is important to 
that person. How do they want to live their lives? 
And then you have to compromise. But what we try 






and do is minimize those compromises, and then get 
the really important stuff right for that person. 
 
demand (having to 
live with 8 other 
people) 
We were asked to go down to [region], work with 3 
individuals with challenging behaviours who were to 
be supported to move into the community 
[previously there had been] a massive inquiry, a big 
scandal. People started coming and asking us to 
support their son or daughter, so that’s how we grew 
in [region]. But it was the first time that we were 




The public – 
maintaining trust 
Prospective 
families – gaining 
trust 
Reconciling 
And as long as you’ve been honest and open with 
[commissioners] in the past, they’ll work with you 
[…] we’ll say, ‘things are going really well, perhaps 
we can reduce this package,’ or ‘you know what? 
this isn’t working for this person, we’re struggling 
with this, we’ve tried this, this and this, we’ve 
brought in external professionals, community 
learning disability nurses, but we just need to have a 
look at the package and reassess’. 
 
Commissioners: 




packages as a way 
of increasing 







When we were talking to the Members Board [they Governing board Resisting 
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asked] ‘have you ever been stopped from making a 
decision for yourself?’ And that’s quite a powerful 
message, isn’t it? So [the Members Board] did a 
presentation about wise decisions […] and they 
showed this film. The film includes somebody going 
off to get a tattoo and […] you have the staff 
member going ‘I can’t let you do that’, and the 
chap’s going ‘well actually it’s not your decision and 
I’m going to do that’. ‘No, but you can’t, I’d get in 
trouble’. ‘No you won’t because it’s my choice to do 
that’. The film talks through how he’s actually made 
an informed choice, and so it’s all right for him to do 
that. And he says that his parents didn’t want him to 
have [the tattoo] that, but he really likes it and wants 
it and he was supported to do so. 
 
of trustees: 
including them in 
decision-making 
and persuading 
them that service 










not get what they 
want 





The longer you’ve supported people, the longer your 
relationship with people’s families and friends and 
the better connected the people you support are, then 
the more people are going to fight their corner [if 
there is a threat that the contract will be re-tendered] 
that’s how we’ve chosen to protect the people. It’s 
not protecting us, it’s protecting them, their life and 










family or friends or advocates that we could call on, 
to say ‘can you make a bit of a fuss’ - cause 
obviously we’ve got the conflict of interest if we’re 
the person advocating for that, we’ve got ‘oh you’re 






                                                     
1 We use the label ‘people with learning difficulties’ because the advocacy group People First regards it as the 
least worst way of categorizing the people who use the services under discussion in this article. 
2 All names of organizations and participants are pseudonyms. 
3 There are differences in the structures that determine and regulate contracting regimes between England and 
Wales, driven to some extent by the increasing devolution of powers from the UK to the four nations, including 
differences in the ways in which health and social care are integrated. Doheny’s (2015) comparative study found 
that the English systems are more ‘marketized’ while the other nations are becoming more bureaucratized. 
However, these differences were not reflected in our findings. 
4 The introduction of new medication that could assist people with mental health conditions to ‘manage’ their 
symptoms initiated a series of policy changes aimed at supporting people within their communities rather than 
in long-stay ‘asylums’. This led to a ‘period of rapid de-institutionalization’ and a continuous programme of 
hospital closures throughout the second part of the 20th century, explicitly confirmed in the 1990 NHS and 
Community Care Act (https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/field/field_publication_file/service-
transformation-lessons-mental-health-4-feb-2014.pdf)   
